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Abstract—In previous analyses IKEv2 has been shown to suffer
from an authentication vulnerability that was considered not
exploitable. By designing and implementing a novel slow Denial-
of-Service attack, which we name the Deviation Attack, we show
that the vulnerability is actually exploitable. We explain the
attack’s requirements, propose possible counter-measures and
propose two possible modifications of the protocol, which both
overcome the vulnerability.
I. INTRODUCTION
Virtual Private Networks (VPN) have been used for decades
by companies, governments and people. VPNs allow con-
necting two or more distant IP entities as if they were in
a single Local Area Network (LAN). By ”entity” we either
mean a network or a single machine. Since the network be-
tween the entities may be non-trusted, connecting the entities
often implies performing some encryption and some address
translation on the IP traffic between them. In a company, an
entity can among other things denote a traveling employee or a
working site. In the military domain, an entity can among other
things denote a soldier on the battle field or a military base.
More recently, we have observed the rise of commercial VPN
services for the greater public. Companies offer individual
consumers to enter one of the companies’ VPNs so that the
consumers can browse the Internet as if they were in one of the
companies’ LANs. Many people use VPN services to spoof
their location in order to access services denied to them based
on their geographical location. Many people also use them to
evade censorship, since VPN services allow them to hide the
content of their packets between them and the VPN service
company. VPNs thus have become a core technology in the
modern secure Internet, and it is crucial that VPNs remain
secure.
A VPN can be achieved using multiple technologies, among
which the Internet Protocol security (IPsec) architecture [1]
is widely used. Moreover, Internet Key Exchange version 2
(IKEv2) [2] is one of the main protocols used to set up IPsec
VPNs. IKEv2 aims at guaranteeing mutual authentication of
two peers, and at automatically generating the shared secret
that will be of the communication’s security warrant. Thus a
secure VPN relies upon the security of IKEv2, and it is of the
utmost importance that IKEv2 be secure.
Previous analyses of IKEv2 [3], [4] have shown that the
protocol satisfies only a weak form of authentication. These
analyses exhibit an execution trace of IKEv2 that violates
strong authentication: the penultimate authentication flaw.
However, this vulnerability was not considered a serious
concern because it did not question the secrecy of the shared
key generated by IKEv2.
In this paper, we start by giving some background on IKEv2
and previous analyses of the protocol in Section II. In Section
III, we design a novel Denial-of-Service (DoS) attack against
IKEv2 that exploits the penultimate authentication flaw. We
call the novel DoS attack the Deviation Attack. The Deviation
Attack bypasses all measures that were introduced in IKEv2
to resist DoS attacks. We thoroughly discuss the Deviation At-
tack’s flow and details, and calculate the precise quantities that
trigger the attack. To demonstrate the Deviation Attack very
concretely, we implement it in Section IV; thereby attacking
an open-source implementation of IKEv2. We experimentally
verify our expression of the triggering quantities through this
experiment, and provide the source code so that the reader can
easily reproduce the attack.
Finally, in Section V, we explore a number of ways
to protect the implementations only using what the current
protocol specification has to offer. However, we only find
mitigations or incomplete workarounds. We therefore tackle
the problem at a higher level: We propose two possible
inexpensive modifications of the protocol, which both prevent
the attack.
For ethical reasons we informed our country’s national
security agency about the existence of the Deviation Attack.
The security agency gave us some technical feedback as well
as its approval for publishing the attack.
II. BACKGROUND
A. The IKEv2 protocol
Internet Key Exchange version 2 (IKEv2) is the authen-
ticated key-exchange protocol used in the Internet Protocol
security architecture (IPsec). Its specification is managed by
the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), and the current
RFC is RFC 7296 [2]. The goal of IKEv2 is to allow two peers
to dynamically negotiate cryptographic algorithms and keys in
order to set up an IPsec communication. As such, it aims to
guarantee mutual authentication of the peers and secrecy of the
negotiated keys. An open-source implementation of IKEv2 is
strongSwan [5].
The IPsec architecture provides security at the networking
layer. It is defined in RFC 4301 [1]. IPsec defines a framework
to establish Virtual Private Networks (VPN). Depending on the
underlying security protocol that is used, IPsec provides either
integrity/authentication protection (AH protocol) or confiden-
tiality and integrity/authentication protection (ESP protocol) of
IP packets that are exchanged between two peers. IPsec also
natively brings some protection against replay attacks (using
this protection is however at the discretion of the receiver of
an IPsec protected packet). To protect packets, IPsec peers
set up Security Associations (SA) between them. A Security
Association is a set of security parameters and keys on which
two peers agree.
Setting up an SA requires that the peers share some en-
cryption keys and involves adding entries to their Security
Association Database (SAD). The keys can be manually
put into the peers’ databases, but the maintenance of such
a configuration becomes cumbersome when the number of
peers grows. To ease management of large VPN setups, it
is much more efficient to rely upon dynamic negotiation of
cryptographic material as defined by the IKEv2 protocol.
We call an exchange the association of a request message
and a response message. IKEv2 consists of three main ex-
changes. The IKE SA INIT exchange performs initial setup
of an IKE SA that will be used to protect subsequent ex-
changes of the IKEv2 protocol. During this exchange, peers
agree upon cryptographic algorithms that should be used to
protect further IKEv2 exchanges and establish some common
cryptographic material by running a Diffie-Hellman protocol.
The IKE AUTH exchange authenticates the peers, validates
the IKE SA and sets up a traffic SA (or Child SA). The authen-
tication can be done using pre-shared key (PSK) or digital sig-
nature. It is a counter-measure to the Man-in-the-Middle attack
that can be performed against the Diffie-Hellman exchange of
IKE SA INIT. Finally, the CREATE CHILD SA exchange
has two different purposes. First, it can be used for rekeying
an IKE SA, i.e. for replacing an old IKE SA with a new
one. In this case, its payloads for performing a Diffie-Hellman
exchange (the key-exchange payloads) are mandatory. Second,
it can be used to create a new traffic SA, or to rekey an existing
one. In this case, the key-exchange payloads are optional. If
not provided, the new keys are simply derived from the IKE
SA’s keys. Using the key-exchange payloads provides Perfect
Forward Secrecy for the new traffic SA’s keys, i.e. their secrecy
will not be impacted by the compromise of the IKE SA’s keys.
The CREATE CHILD SA exchange is performed multiple
times during the lifetime of an IKE SA.
B. Related work
In 1999, Meadows finds two authentication weaknesses in
IKEv1 [6], using the NRL protocol analyzer. The first one is a
reflection attack, and the second one is called the penultimate
authentication flaw.
In 2003, IKEv2 is formally verified in the context of the
AVISPA project [3]. The authors find that IKEv2 also suffers
from the penultimate authentication flaw. However, they say
that it cannot be exploited for further purposes. They propose
a counter-measure anyway: the key confirmation.
In 2010, Cremers performs an extensive analysis of IKEv2
[4] using the Scyther tool. He confirms that IKEv2 suffers from
the penultimate authentication flaw and, like in the AVISPA
project, concludes that this vulnerability is harmless.
The penultimate authentication flaw is an execution trace
of IKEv2 that violates the weak agreement authentication
property. Weak agreement is a property that was first defined
by Lowe in [7]. This property states that whenever an agent
A has completed the protocol, apparently with an agent B,
then B has previously been running the protocol, apparently
with A. In the penultimate authentication flaw, A starts a
session as initiator and wants to talk to C. But the intruder
deviates every message A sends, to Responder B, and every
message B sends, back to A (of course messages sent by B
were already addressed to A, so whether the intruder does
not do anything or intercept it and forward it, the attack
remains). The parties proceed normally until A receives the
IKE AUTH response. The AUTH payload is not signed with
the private key of C, so A does not set up a Child SA. A then
sends an IKEv2 INFORMATIONAL message containing an
AUTHENTICATION FAILED notification payload. Intruder
intercepts it and drops it. In the end, B has set up a Child SA
with A, whereas A did not want to set up a Child SA with B.
This is a violation of weak agreement for the responder.
The penultimate authentication flaw is not a full violation
of the intuitive definition of authentication, because there is no
actual impersonation and secrecy is still satisfied. However, we
show in the next Section that the penultimate authentication
flaw allows a Denial-of-Service attack.
III. THE DEVIATION ATTACK
A. Preliminaries
We assume the existence of N + M + 2 IKEv2 parties
called (Initiatori)1≤i≤N , (Responderi)1≤i≤M , Probe, and Vic-
tim. Each party may be either an IKEv2 endpoint (also called
host) or a gateway. Figure 1 presents the attack scenario. On
this figure and throughout the paper, we use the term m1 as an
abbreviation for IKE SA INIT request. We define accordingly
the terms m2, m3, and m4.
(Initiatori)1≤i≤N , (Responderi)1≤i≤M , and Victim are con-
nected by a network Net1. Probe and Victim are connected by
a network Net2. Net1 and Net2 may be the same network and
may be the Internet. We write (Ii)1≤i≤N , (Ri)1≤i≤M and V
the Net1 IP addresses.
We call connection the set of SAs that were stored in
a party’s memory right after an IKEv2 phase 1 session
(one IKE SA INIT exchange and one IKE AUTH exchange).
Therefore if everything went well, connection denotes the
set of SAs containing the newly created IKE SA and its
first Child SA. However, if e.g. authentication succeeded but
traffic selector negotiation failed, then connection denotes the
newly created IKE SA alone. We say that a party handles a
connection from the moment the party installs the connection
(stores it in memory) until the moment the party deletes the
connection.
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Fig. 1. Scenario of the Deviation Attack. Intruder deviates p1 and p4 and drops p7.
Let Lapp be the application load, i.e. the amount of memory
occupied by IKEv2 in Victim when there are no connection
installed. We assume that Lapp stays the same during the
attack, i.e. is constant in time. Let L be the load of Victim,
i.e the amount of Victim’s memory that is occupied by (1)
the application and by (2) connections with machines that are
not Probe or Initiator machines. In practice, there could be
other machines than Probe or Initiator machines initiating or
removing connections during the attack, i.e. in general L is
not constant in time. However, we assume for the sake of
simplicity that L is constant in time. We also assume that
Victim’s memory is statically limited, i.e. there is no way for
Victim to obtain more memory capacity during the attack. Let
C be the memory capacity that was allocated to IKEv2 in
Victim. We assume that C was carefully chosen and that we
have C > L.
We say that a connection in a party’s memory is unin-
tended when it was not taken into account when memory
was allocated to the party. Let m be the amount of memory
needed to store all data related to one connection. We say
that a connection in a party’s memory is stale from the
beginning, when the party has received no IKEv2 message for
it since it was installed. After some time and some unanswered
rekeying requests or keep-alive requests, the party removes the
connection. Let S be the average time a connection stale from
the beginning stays in Victim’s memory.
Let Intruder be a machine, connected to Net1. Let t = 0
be the beginning of the attack and D be the attack duration.
We assume for the sake of simplicity that the Initiator parties
send m1 messages to Responder parties at a constant rate σ
between t = 0 and t = D. We express σ in number of IKE
messages per second (and not in packets per second, in case
there is fragmentation). We also assume that, at t = 0, no
Initiator party has any SA established with Victim.
For the purpose of detecting an eventual Denial-of-Service,
we make Probe regularly send m1 messages to Victim.
However, we do not want Probe to affect Victim’s memory
occupation. We thus make Probe’s connections in Victim
ephemeral, i.e. Probe’s connections are removed after a short
time from Victim’s memory. See Section IV-A for a way to
achieve this for the strongSwan IKEv2 implementation.
Let m4t be the m4 message that Probe receives at time
t, and let m1t be the m1 message sent by Probe that led to
m4t (i.e. that belongs to the same session). Let Tr(σ, t) be the
response time of Victim to Probe at time t when throughput
is σ. We define this response time as the difference between
t and the time at which m1t was sent. We assume that the
response time of Victim to Probe is the same as the response
time of Victim to any of the Initiator parties. Let Tacc be the
maximum response time acceptable by Probe, i.e. the response
time after which Probe considers that it has been denied a
service. The value of Tacc is fixed arbitrarily.
We define the following propositions:
Req1 Intruder has the ability to intercept every IP packet sent
by an Initiator party to a Responder party. When Intruder
intercepts a packet, the recipient does not receive it. In
addition, Intruder can either drop the packet, or modify
its destination IP address and send it to Victim.
Req2 All Initiator parties authenticate themselves using sig-
nature mode.
Req3 All Initiator parties are trusted by Victim. This means
that Victim’s Peer Authorization Database (see [1]) allows
connections with all Initiator parties.
Req4 All m1 messages sent by Initiator parties contain at least
one SA proposal (see [1]) that is acceptable to Victim.
B. Attack flow
Assume that Req1, Req2, Req3 and Req4 are satisfied. The
attack proceeds as follows. Intruder intercepts all m1 messages
sent by Initiator parties to Responder parties. Let us consider
the implications of one specific m1 message sent by Initiatori
to Responderj . This message is sent in an IP packet p1. The
message flow is shown on figure 1.
Thanks to Req1, Intruder intercepts the request, changes the
destination IP address to V, and sends it to Victim (packet p2).
We call this process deviation.
In response, because Req4 is satisfied, Victim sends an m2
message to Initiatori (packet p3). Initiatori receives it, and
sends an m3 message to Responderj (packet p4). Intruder
deviates the m3 message to Victim (packet p5).
On reception of the m3 message, authentication of Initiatori
to Victim succeeds because authentication is done using
signature mode (Req2) and because Initiatori is trusted by
Victim (Req3). However, TS and cryptographic algorithms
negotiation may fail (TS negotiation will fail in most cases).
If TS and cryptographic algorithms negotiation fail, then only
one IKE SA is stored. If TS and cryptographic algorithms
negotiation do not fail, then one IKE SA and one Child SA
are stored. According to our definition of ”connection”, at
this point Victim has installed one connection with Initiatori.
Victim then sends an m4 message to Initiatori (packet p6).
On reception of the m4 message, Initiatori fails the au-
thentication step, since it intended to speak with Responderj ,
not with Victim. Initiatori thus sends an IKEv2 notification
AUTHENTICATION FAILED to Responderj (packet p7). In-
truder intercepts the notification and drops it (thanks to Req1).
As a result, an unintended connection was added in Victim’s
memory.
In this paper, we only explore memory exhaustion as a
possible cause of Denial-of-Service. We state that if Req1,
Req2, Req3 and Req4 are satisfied, then there is a throughput
σ that allows Intruder to cause a Denial-of-Service. More
formally:
Theorem III.1. If Req1, Req2, Req3 and Req4 are satisfied,
then:
{σ | ∃t ∈ [0, D] | Tr(σ, t) > Tacc} 6= ∅ (1)
Proof: Since Victim’s memory is statically limited, there
exists a throughput σ such that, at some time during the attack,
Victim is in Denial-of-Service by memory exhaustion.
C. Minimum throughput and DoS time
We can now define Σmem as the minimum throughput
triggering a memory exhaustion.
Definition III.1.
Σmem = min({σ | ∃t ∈ [0, D] | Tr(σ, t) > Tacc})
When σ > Σmem, we define T smem(σ) as the time at which
DoS starts, and T emem(σ) as the time at which DoS ends.
Definition III.2. Let σ > Σmem. We define:
T smem(σ) = min({t ∈ [0, D] | Tr(σ, t) > Tacc})
T emem(σ) = max({t ∈ [0, D] | Tr(σ, t) > Tacc})
We confront the following theorem with the experiment in
Section IV. To do so we implement the Deviation Attack and
measure in different experimental setups the time at which
DoS starts.









T emem(σ) = max(D,S)
Proof:
Summing up implications of all m1 messages sent by
Initiator parties to Responder parties, at time t, Victim has
installed σ × t connections in its memory. However, all
these connections are stale from the beginning, so they are
removed after S seconds. Therefore at time t, the number of
unintended connections that are present in Victim’s memory
is σ×min(t, S). Victim thus suffers from memory exhaustion
at time t if and only if:
σ ×min(t, S) > C − L
m
Since the attack last D seconds, the attack leads to a memory
exhaustion if and only if:
σ ×min(D,S) > C − L
m
Which yields our expression of Σmem.
Now we assume that σ > Σmem. Memory exhaustion will
start as soon as:
σ × t > C − L
m
Which yields our expression of Tmem.
Memory exhaustion lasts until connections are removed and
the attack has stopped, i.e. until T emem(σ) = max(D,S).
D. Discussion of the Deviation Attack
a) The Deviation Attack when pre-shared keys are in use:
Note that we do not require that Victim authenticates itself
using signature mode. In other words, even if authentication
is performed asymmetrically, with Victim using signature and
the Initiator machines using PSK, the attack still works.
Moreover they may be looser requirements than the ones
we impose in this paper. For example the Deviation Attack is
possible when the Initiator machines and Victim use a PSK to
communicate with each other and when this PSK is the same
as the one used by the Initiator and Responder machines to
communicate with each other. If those two PSKs are different
then the attack does not work.
b) Why Initiatori does not refuse message p3: In the
context of a Deviation Attack, Initiatori sees that the source
IP address of message p3 (see figure 1) is not the destination
address of message p1. At first glance, this observation could
be the witness of an odd situation. However, the IKEv2 RFC
specifically says that “Incoming IKE packets are mapped to an
IKE SA only using the packet’s SPI, not using (for example)
the source IP address of the packet” [2]. This is why Initiatori
does not refuse message p3.
c) A way to obtain enough requests to deviate: For
the attack to work, there need to be a sufficient rate of
IKE SA INIT requests that are sent from the Initiator parties
to the Responder parties, in a duration short enough. If
this situation never arises, Intruder may have a workaround:
it can drop all messages coming from the Initiator parties
and going to the Responder parties, for a given time. After
some unanswered IKEv2 keep-alive requests (if Dead Peer
Detection is activated, see Section V-A) or some unanswered
CREATE CHILD SA requests, the Initiator parties may con-
sider their connections with the Responder parties as broken
and may send new IKE SA INIT requests for each broken
connection. This solution works for example if the connections
are configured so as to be automatically set back up when
broken (option “closeaction=restart” in strongSwan), or so as
to be automatically set up when an outbound IP packet arrives
(option “auto=route” in strongSwan).
d) Classification among DoS attacks: The Deviation
Attack belongs to the category of slow DoS attacks (SDA).
A definition of SDAs is given in [8]. An SDA is a DoS attack
that requires very low amount of bandwidth. To do so, SDAs
usually target a listening daemon on a host by exploiting some
application layer vulnerability. Indeed, the Deviation Attack
makes an IKEv2 daemon unavailable by exploiting a weakness
in the application and requires very low amount of bandwidth
compared to classic flooding DoS techniques.
Although it seems easier to do a simple denial of service
using a high traffic load, protection from classic flooding tech-
niques is possible by means of Intrusion Detection Systems
(IDS). The Deviation Attack is much harder to detect.
IV. ATTACKING AN IKEV2 IMPLEMENTATION
To concretely demonstrate the Deviation Attack implica-
tions, we attack the strongSwan open-source IKEv2 implemen-
tation. Our experiment code is available at [9]. Our experiment
also allows us to experimentally verify our expression T smem
that we give in theorem III.2.
A. Setup
a) Global setup: In our experiment, target IKEv2 imple-
mentation is strongSwan version 5.1.2. However throughout
this Section, we will use the software term when covering a
topic that is not specific to strongSwan. Except when indicated,
we use the default options for software.
To reproduce the attack, we create 3 Linux Virtual Machines
(VM) representing Victim, Probe and Intruder, and Ndemo
VMs representing (Initiatori)1≤i≤N , where Ndemo is a config-
urable parameter. We do not instantiate the Responders, since
we only need their IP addresses; we do not really need the
machines.
All machines are connected through the same local (virtu-
alized) network, and they are the only ones connected to it.
Using Section III-A notation, we have Net1 = Net2 and this
network is local. Using a local network allows us to easily
reproduce the deviation of packets by Intruder, as explained
below. Moreover it ensures more control over networking
propagation times and over the daemon’s resource loads.
We create a Certificate Authority that we call CA. We
generate for Probe, Victim and each Initiator a certificate
signed by CA, and its associated private key. We place in
Probe, Victim and each Initiator their respective certificates
and private keys, along with CA’s certificate.
b) Implementing the Initiators: We decided, for practical
reasons, not to create the N Initiators of the generic scenario,
but instead to only create Ndemo Initiators, with each of them
sending NNdemo m1 messages to the Responders. Furthermore,
we make the Initiators intending to talk to only one Responder
peer. This makes it easier to implement Intruder because that
way Intruder only needs to spoof one IP address (see below
to understand why Intruder performs spoofing). Because of
these simplifications and to stay faithful to the generic scenario
depicted in Section III, we had to change two options of
strongSwan in Victim and the Initiators. We explain that in
the experiment code’s README.md file.
For strongSwan, we set the rightid option in the Initiators
like below. The “%” sign forces strongSwan not to send IDr
in the IKE AUTH request. We explain in Section IV-C why
this is necessary.
rightid="%CN=responder"
Listing 1. The rightid option in strongSwan
The Initiators try to establish connections with Responder
at a configurable rate σ. We stop the attack after some
configurable time D.
c) Implementing Intruder: To reproduce the deviation of
packets by Intruder, we use an ARP cache poisoning attack
[10]. In this attack, Intruder sends ARP replies to all Initiators,
binding its MAC address to Responder’s IP. This way, all
packets sent by Initiators to Responder are intercepted by
Intruder. To perform this attack, we use the arpspoof tool [11]
in Intruder. We then use Linux iptables command to redirect
the traffic towards Victim and to drop the AUTH FAILED
notification. Of course this method is only possible because
we use a local network. In reality, when Net1 is not a local
network, deviation has to be made using other ways.
d) Implementing Victim: We use Linux Control groups
(Cgroups) to allocate a (configurable) memory of exactly C
to Victim for software. Note that in our setup, TS payloads
sent by the Initiators are not valid propositions for Victim.
Thus a connection will only consist of one childless IKE SA
(containing two unidirectional SAs).
We observed in our experiment that when there is no
memory left for software, the Linux Out-Of-Memory killer
(OOM killer) of Victim kills the software process. This
leads to the loss of all installed SAs. This is undesirable
behaviour: setting back up all SAs might take some time,
meanwhile suspending the protected IP flow that used traffic
SAs. To observe a memory exhaustion in our experiment, we
therefore disable the Out-Of-Memory killer of the kernel and
of software’s control group in Victim.
e) Implementing Probe: The Probe VM tries to set up
a new IPsec connection every 2 seconds (configurable). For
each attempt, after Tacc = 5 s (configurable), Probe checks
if the attempt has succeeded and reports the result. Finally,
as explained in Section III-A, we make Probe’s connections
in Victim ephemeral. To do so, we use specific options for
strongSwan in Victim. We explain that in the experiment
code’s README.md file.
B. Verifying our DoS time expression
To experimentally verify our expression of T smem, we mea-
sure L and m for software in the context of our setup, verify
that L and m are constants (i.e. that they do not depend on




We measured σ during the experiment (measured σ) and
observed that it was different from the σ we configured
(configured σ). This is most probably due to virtualization.
For the experimental verification of theorem III.2 not to be
affected by the fact that configured σ and measured σ are
different we thus use measured σ to calculate the T smem value
predicted by theorem III.2 (Expected T smem).
For consistency we use a warm up run. Furthermore for
each tuple (C, σ) we perform the measure of T smem (resp. σ)
10 times. We then take the average of T smem’s (resp. σ’s) mea-
sures as our value of measured T smem (resp. measured σ).
To measure m we fill Victim’s memory with a high number
of connections at some given throughput, and divide the
memory increase by the number of connections. There are
several ways to measure the amount of memory used by a
process. To be consistent with how we limit memory available
to software (using cgroups), we take the value stored in
software’s cgroup file memory.usage in bytes.
In our experiment, we have L = Lapp, where Lapp is the
amount of memory occupied by IKEv2 in Victim when there
is no connection installed (as defined in Section III-A). To
measure L we thus simply measure the amount of memory
used by software when there are no connections installed.
C. Results
We observe that strongSwan differs from IKEv2’s RFC on
one point. When the IKE AUTH request IDr payload does not
correspond to any of the responder’s identities, strongSwan
notifies that no matching peer configuration has been found
and cancels the IKE SA establishment. In the RFC, it is said
the following: “If the IDr proposed by the initiator is not
acceptable to the responder, the responder might use some
other IDr to finish the exchange”. In other words, if IDr does
not correspond to one of its identities, the responder might
install a Child SA anyway, and use some other IDr to finish
the exchange.
The IKE AUTH request IDr payload is optional, both
in the RFC and in strongSwan. The behaviour adopted by
strongSwan and described above thus implies the following
for the Deviation Attack: When the Initiator machines run
strongSwan and are configured so as to not send an IDr pay-
load, the attack works. However, when they run strongSwan
and are configured so as to send an IDr payload, the attack
does not work, since IDr would be equal to a Responder
machine’s identity, and not Victim’s.
Not sending IDr payload in an IKE AUTH request is
not an uncommon configuration, since it allows to hide the
responder’s identity to an active attacker. We explain this in
section V-A.
Our measures of L and m confirm that L and m do not
depend on C or σ (or very little). We obtain L ≈ 1 MB and
m ≈ 18.805 kB. Figure 2 shows the result of our measures
of T smem. Our measures are close to the values predicted by
theorem III.2: we obtain an average relative error of 1.3% and
a maximum relative error of 2.4%.
V. COUNTER-MEASURES
A. Trying to protect implementations of the current protocol
Users who cannot afford to be targeted by the Deviation
Attack need immediate protection. In this Section, we show
that the cookie and puzzle mechanisms that were introduced
in IKEv2 to resist DoS attacks are of no use against the
Deviation Attack. We then note that Dead Peer Detection can
be a small mitigation and consider two measures that prevent
the attack but suffer from significant drawbacks: using PSK
authentication and giving enough resources to Victim.
a) Existing DoS counter-measures: The cookie mecha-
nism [2] was introduced to protect IKEv2 against a mem-
ory exhaustion due to reception of a large amount of
IKE SA INIT requests. If this mechanism is in place, when
the responder detects a large number of half-open IKE SAs,
it responds to each IKE SA INIT request (that does not
contain a cookie) with an IKEv2 INFORMATIONAL message
containing a cookie. The cookie is a keyed hash of the request.
The initiator then sends the same request again with the
cookie added to it, and the responder verifies that the cookie
and the request match. This means that the attacker needs
C (in MB) 50 50 50 50 200 200 200 200
Configured σ (in m1 messages/s) 1 5 10 30 1 5 10 30
Measured σ (in m1 messages/s) 1.0 4.8 9.5 25.6 1.0 4.9 9.5 24.1
Expected T smem (in s) 2605 541 274 101 10582 2159 1111 438
Measured T smem (in s) 2617 547 280 103 10771 2202 1124 445
Relative error in % 0.5 1.1 2.1 2.4 1.8 2.0 1.1 1.6
Fig. 2. Predicting and measuring DoS start time T smem during some Deviation Attacks against strongSwan.
to keep in memory the IKE SA INIT requests it sends. It
thus makes it more costly for an attacker to fill the half-
open SA database of a gateway. However, in the Deviation
Attack, cookies will be handled by the Initiator parties and
not by Intruder. Activating cookies thus has absolutely no
effect on Intruder’s memory requirements. Therefore, it does
not increase the cost of the attack in terms of memory. Note
that the cookie mechanism also increases the time between the
reception of an IKE SA INIT request by Victim and the filling
of its memory with the new SA. But this neither increases the
throughput of packets the attacker needs to deviate, nor the
duration needed for the Deviation Attack to succeed.
The puzzle mechanism is specified in [12]. It is an improve-
ment of the cookie mechanism. The initiator now needs to
remember its request and to solve a puzzle before sending
its request again. Like the cookie mechanism, the puzzle
mechanism is stateless for the responder. Puzzles increase the
cost of an attack in CPU power. However, in the deviation
attack, it is the Initiator parties who need to solve the puzzles,
not the Intruder. So puzzles, like cookies, are of no use against
the Deviation Attack.
b) Dead Peer Detection: Dead Peer Detection [13]
(DPD) is a mechanism left as an option in IKEv2. In fact,
in strongSwan, it is not enabled by default. When DPD is in
use, whenever a party sees that no traffic has recently been
received on an IKE SA or any of its Child SAs, then it may
send a keep-alive request to the SA’s peer. If the peer does not
respond, after several retransmissions, the party may remove
the IKE SA and all its Child SAs from its memory. In the
context of the Deviation Attack, DPD reduces S, the average
time a connection stale from the beginning stays in memory.
Since Σmem is inversely proportional to S, DPD makes it
harder to achieve a memory exhaustion using the Deviation
Attack.
However, reducing S too much can create an overload on
the network, so S cannot be too low. When DPD is enabled
in strongSwan, using default values for the other options, we
have S = 195s, which multiplies Σmem by 18. Therefore,
DPD only mitigates memory exhaustion.
c) Pre-Shared Key authentication: As we point out in
Section III-B, the Deviation Attack is not possible when PSKs
are used for authentication, provided that the Initiator ma-
chines and Victim do not share the same PSK as the Initiator
machines and the Responder machines. Therefore using PSK
is a counter-measure. However, PSKs and certificates do not
fulfil the exact same needs. PSKs are used when the number of
peers is relatively low. If this is not the case, another counter-
measure must be considered.
d) Giving enough resources to Victim: One solution to
the memory exhaustion is to give enough memory power to
Victim to handle as many connections as there can be. Victim
would then need to be given a memory of at least Lapp+Nt×
m, where Nt is the number of peers that Victim trusts. This
counter-measure is efficient since memory is cheap nowadays.
However, IKEv2 should not rely on such a recommendation
to its users.
B. Improving the protocol specification
Attempts to protect implementations of the current protocol
are either not sufficient to prevent the Deviation Attack, or
present significant drawbacks. For this reason, we propose
two modifications of the protocol specification that deter its
vulnerability to the Deviation Attack.
a) Using IDr payload: A way to modify the protocol
would be to make the IDr payload in IKE AUTH request
mandatory, and to modify its processing by the responder.
The appropriate behaviour would be not to install a Child
SA when IDr is not acceptable (defined below), but instead,
to cancel the establishment of the IKE SA, by sending an
AUTHENTICATION FAILED notification to the Initiator.
Let us define the term acceptable we used above. The IPsec
and IKEv2 specifications should have a new mandatory field in
the PAD. We call this field the local ID field. We should also
rename the ID field, described in RFC 4301, Section 4.4.3,
to remote ID field, for consistency. The local ID field would
be a non-empty list of IDs. Each ID would be in the same
format as the ID field (it can use wildcards, for example).
When an IKE AUTH request arrives, a PAD lookup is done.
A PAD entry would match the request when both the remote
ID field and the local ID field match respectively the IDi and
IDr payloads.
Note that, as we explain in Section IV-C, strongSwan
already implemented the local ID field. It corresponds to the
leftid attribute of the ipsec.conf configuration file.
The IDr modification, however, has one drawback. Assume
Alice initiates an IKEv2 session with Bob, using the non-
modified protocol. According to [14], IKEv2 was designed so
as to hide both identities from a passive attacker and Bob’s
identity from an active attacker as well. It does not hide Alice’s
identity from an active attacker because it is Alice who reveals
its identity first using IDi payload. The attacker can learn this
identity by impersonating Bob’s IP address.
Now assume that we modify the protocol using the IDr
method. Using the same attack where the intruder imperson-
ates Bob, the intruder is now able to learn the identity of
Bob, and even to prove that Alice intended to speak to Bob.
In other words, this modification works but the responder’s
identity would no longer be hidden from an active attacker.
This may be a problem if sensitive information can be found
in the ID payload. This is often the case, as people often
use Distinguished Names (DN), where the country, institution
name and email address are given.
b) Adding key confirmation: There is a way to modify
IKEv2-Sig that does not require to disclose the responder ID
before it is cryptographically verified. We add a third ex-
change, called the key confirmation and written KEY CONF.
This exchange is exactly the same as an IKEv2 keep-alive
exchange: an empty INFORMATIONAL request and an empty
INFORMATIONAL response. We require that the responder
installs its connection only after having received a valid
KEY CONF request and that the initiator installs its connec-
tion only after having received a valid KEY CONF response.
Key confirmation was first proposed by Basin et al. in [3] as a
counter-measure to the penultimate authentication flaw. Since
the Deviation Attack exploits the latter, key confirmation is a
counter-measure to the Deviation Attack.
One other modification could have been to simply add a
mandatory AUTH SUCCESS message as an acknowledge-
ment to the IKE AUTH response. However, in IKEv2, all
messages, except for error messages, exist in pairs. This is
because IKEv2 is carried over UDP, so the only way to be
sure that a request has been received is to wait for a response
message and to set up retransmissions in case it does not arrive
(until a timeout). With the KEY CONF response, the initiator
is now sure, when it installs its connection, that the responder
has installed its.
Adding an exchange to the protocol can be seen as a
increase of its cost, as it will take a more time to establish a
connection. But a KEY CONF message requires only a very
little amount of time and computational power to generate and
process, because there is no asymmetric cryptography or key
derivation operations to perform. It is therefore a very efficient
solution to prevent the Deviation Attack.
VI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we designed a novel slow Denial-of-Service
attack against IKEv2: the Deviation attack. We explained
its working flow, and precisely evaluated its requirements
and consequences. To concretely demonstrate the attack, we
successfully implemented it against the strongSwan open-
source implementation. The source code to reproduce the
Deviation Attack is available at [9].
The central position that IKEv2 occupies in modern in-
frastructures leaves no doubt that counter-measures need to
be taken. We discussed the efficiency of the available means
to protect implementations of the current protocol. However,
none of them were complete solutions. Worse, the cookie
and puzzle mechanisms that were introduced in IKEv2 to
counter DoS attacks are completely ineffective against the
Deviation Attack. We thus tackled the problem at a higher
level and proposed two possible inexpensive modifications of
the protocol, which both prevent the attack.
Finally, as we have seen, this paper outlines the importance
of the weak agreement property for authentication protocols.
Its violation does not necessarily imply a violation of secrecy,
but we have shown that it can allow other attacks. In particular,
when the protocol sets up some connection in the parties’
memories, it can lead to a DoS attack. It could be interesting
to verify weak agreement for TLS, SSH, and other stateful
authentication protocols.
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